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Institutions or resources and capabilities? Explaining engagement in European sectoral social 
dialogue  
 
Thomas Prosser, Barbara Bechter, Manuela Galetto, Sabrina Weber and Bengt Larsson 
 
We analyse social partner engagement in European sectoral social dialogue, testing two prominent 
theories to disentangle sector and country dynamics: institutional and resources and capabilities 
theories. While institutional theory accounted for certain social partner preferences, resources and 
capability theory proved stronger in predicting participation and provided insight into regulatory 
preferences. We conclude that resources and capability theory better explains our case, associating it 
with weaknesses of transnational governance. Specifically, limited incentives for participation mean 
that social partners with fewer resources forego participation, entailing pre-eminence of social 




Institutional theory and resources and capabilities theory represent different approaches to actor 
agency, the former asserting that institutional coordination predicts behaviour, the latter emphasizing 
resources and capabilities. Despite research on the implications of such theories for social dialogue, 
no existing work simultaneously tests the explanatory power of such theories. This is a crucial 
endeavour. Not only will it develop knowledge of such approaches, but it will advance understanding 
of the conditions in which social partners effectively partake in European social dialogue. 
 
In this article, we test whether institutional theory or resources and capabilities theory explain social 
partner engagement in European sectoral social dialogue. This is a most relevant case. Social dialogue 
is a major part of European social policy, involving European-level negotiations between employers’ 
associations and trade unions (the social partners) and producing multiple outputs (Streeck, 1994; 
Keller and Sörries, 1999; Marginson, 2005; Prosser, 2016). European Sectoral Social Dialogue 
Committees (SSDCs) are a key forum. Following their establishment in 1998 by the European 
Commission, SSDCs have promoted dialogue between social partners at European level, exist in more 
than 40 sectors and produce output which is legally and non-legally binding. 
 
Engagement is defined as participation, which entails involvement in social dialogue meetings, and 
regulatory preferences, which are the forms of output advocated by social partners. We test three 
hypotheses against the theories; (1a) coordination of domestic institutions will predict participation in 
SSDCs or (1b) resources and capabilities will predict participation in SSDCs; (2a) employers in more 
liberal regimes will be more resistant to regulation than employers in more coordinated regimes or 
(2b) resources and capabilities will predict employer resistance to regulation; (3a) unions in more 
liberal regimes will be more desirous of regulation than unions in more coordinated regimes or (3b) 
resources and capabilities will predict union desire for regulation. 
 
Both approaches explained different aspects of engagement in European sectoral social dialogue. 
Resources and capabilities theories strongly predicted participation (H1), though were less adept at 
explaining regulatory preferences (H2 and H3). Institutional theories accounted for certain social 
partner preferences (H3), though were unable to elucidate participation (H1). Notwithstanding 
comparative strengths of both approaches, resources and capabilities theories were more effective 
than institutional theories and better explain social partner participation in sectoral social dialogue. 
Wider implications are evaluated. Specifically, we associate the inability of the theories to explain 
certain results with weaknesses of transnational governance, embodied in European sectoral social 
dialogue. Limited incentives for participation mean that social partners with fewer resources forego 
participation, entailing pre-eminence of social partners with greater resources and hindering outcomes 






2. Theorizing social partner behaviour 
 
Scholars have long debated social partner behaviour. A first group favour explanations based on 
institutional theories; such approaches predict that social partner behaviour will be consonant with the 
socio-economic systems in which they are embedded. Advocates of a famous rational institutional 
theory, Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice, 2001), thus contend that social partners in 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) will attempt coordination, whereas social partners in Liberal 
Market Economies (LMEs) will act in a competitive manner. Such behaviour is rooted in the logics of 
national systems; separate competitive advantages imply distinct incentive structures for social 
partners. Though social partner agency is correspondingly minor, reflecting structural imperatives, 
social partner internalize ‘rules of the game’ and undertake strategies which are consonant with 
structural positions (North, 1990).  
 
Specific work on social partners has elaborated the conditions in which agency is feasible. Some 
interpret social partner engagement with public authorities as political choices reflecting balances of 
power (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007; Culpepper and Regan, 2014), whilst others point to social partner 
assistance in designing and mobilizing support for reform (Culpepper, 2002). Studies of European 
social dialogue note the capacity of social partners to produce European norms and rules (Léonard, 
2008), though emphasize constraints associated with policy competences (De Boer et al., 2005) and 
mandates (Léonard, 2011). Notwithstanding certain emphasis on agency, such literature prefers 
historical institutionalist explanations. Martin and Swank (2012) underline the salience of historical 
conditions in the construction of business interests, whilst others emphasize synergies between social 
partner behaviour and embedding systems (Jackson and Muellenborn, 2012; Wilkinson and Wood, 
2012). Recent stress on the tendency of coordinated capitalism to erode (Baccaro and Howell, 2017) 
is unlikely to change core preoccupations. Though countries such as Germany have undergone 
liberalization (Streeck, 2009; Thelen, 2014), these processes are often underpinned by market-friendly 
patterns of social partner coordination which are rare in LMEs; Streeck (2009) calls this 
Williamsonian coordination. Different levels of coordination thus continue to characterize national 
systems.  
 
Resources and capability theory offers a second perspective on social partner behaviour. Following 
the work of Korpi (1985) and Offe and Wiesenthal (1980), which underlined the extent to which 
welfare states and industrial relations systems were based on political power of workers, scholars have 
emphasized the resources and capabilities of social partners. Resources and capabilities theory shares 
rational institutionalism’s emphasis upon actor capacity, even if the approach acknowledges 
institutional constraints on agency.  
 
Resources and capability theory has underpinned recent work on social partner behaviour. Lévesque 
and Murray (2010) hypothesize that union strength is contingent upon access to four resources 
(internal solidarity, network embeddedness, narrative resources and infrastructural resources), the 
potency of which is dependent upon four strategic capabilities (intermediation between contending 
interests, framing, articulation of actions and learning). Other studies of unions develop related 
explanations (Refslund and Arnholtz, 2020; Seeliger, 2017), whilst analyses of employers’ 
associations stress the power variable (Gooberman, 2019a; 2019b). Work on European social dialogue 
also emphasizes resources and capabilities, asserting that power relations vitalize transnational 
industrial relations structures (Keune and Marginson, 2013; Marginson, 2016).  
 
Despite studies of the capacity of institutional and resources and capabilities theories to explain 
engagement in European social dialogue, there is little work which simultaneously tests such theories. 
We undertake this task, examining social partner involvement in European sectoral social dialogue 
committees (SSDCs). This is achieved through the preparation of hypotheses, rooted in competing 
predictions of institutional and resources and capabilities theories, which are consequently tested with 
data. We define engagement as consisting of participation and regulatory preferences. Participation 
entails involvement in SSDCs, e.g. meetings and their preparation, whilst regulatory preferences are 
the forms of SSDC output advocated by social partners. Aside from contributing to literature on 
European social dialogue, our work provides valuable insight into the extent to which institutional and 
resources and capabilities theories can explain social partner behaviour in a transnational setting, 
contributing to deeper knowledge and refined use of such theories.  
 
(1a) Coordination of domestic institutions will predict participation in SSDCs 
 
Institutional theories posit that social partners in more coordinated regimes have greater capacity. This 
is related to the more significant role of social partners in coordinated systems. Owing to the need to 
achieve coordination, social partners play key roles in systems of collective bargaining and typically 
have higher levels of membership density. In more liberal systems, in which firms engage in 
competition and social partners tend to be weak, the situation is inverse. Though binaries between 
liberal and coordinated systems have eroded, countries such as Germany undergoing liberalization 
(Streeck, 2009; Thelen, 2014), these processes are underpinned by market-friendly patterns of social 
partner coordination which are rare in LMEs. Different levels of coordination thus continue to 
characterize national systems (see table one). This hypothesis overlaps with hypothesis 1b, reflecting 
rational institutionalism’s emphasis upon actor capacity, yet coordination is distinct from resources 
and capabilities.  
 
Owing to discrepant potential benefits of European social dialogue, it may be that certain social 
partners are reticent (see hypotheses 2 and 3). Given that both unions in coordinated regimes and 
employers in liberal regimes may be more reluctant, effects related to incentives might cancel 
themselves out; such effects may also be found to be insignificant. We thus hypothesize that the 
superior capacity of social partners in more coordinated systems will lead to more significant 
participation. Table one operationalizes degrees of coordination in our cases. There is external data on 
institutional coordination, for example the ICTWSS index, yet there are no relevant sectoral data. We 
rank sectoral coordination from 1-4, taking into account social partner density and collective 
bargaining practices and density. Though social partner and collective bargaining density rates are 
important to scores, we are attentive to the extent to which practices ensure coordination.  
 
‘Table one about here’ 
 
(1b) Resources and capabilities will predict participation in SSDCs 
 
Several accounts hypothesize that social partner strength is contingent upon access to resources which 
are subsequently used effectively (Lévesque and Murray, 2010; Seeliger, 2017). Studies of the 
dialogue emphasize the wider importance of power (Keune and Marginson, 2013), yet research shows 
that two resources are particularly germane: language and money (Pochet et al., 2009; Prosser and 
Perin, 2015). Owing to the predominance of certain languages in SSDCs, mainly English but also 
French and German, those social partners who do not speak these languages have difficulty 
participating in meetings. Money exerts a similar constraint. There is funding for SSDC participation 
– the European Commission finances up to 28 delegates from each side in plenary sessions, 15 in 
working groups and 5 in steering group meetings – yet certain social partners consider this 
insufficient.  
 
It is difficult to locate external information on the language competence and financial resources of 
social partners. Though data exist on language competence within countries, there is no specific 
information on social partners. These data rather emerge in the course of fieldwork (see section IV). 
Owing to the difficulty of compiling data on language competence and financial resources prior to 
fieldwork, as we did with degrees of coordination, we do not prepare a table operationalizing the 
resources and capabilities of social partners.  
 
  
(2a) Employers in more liberal regimes will be more resistant to regulation than employers in more 
coordinated regimes  
 
A key tenet of institutional theory is that liberal regimes obtain competitive advantage from the 
limited systems of social protection which exist in these countries. This equilibrium is underpinned by 
the attitude of employers. In coordinated regimes, the situation is inverse. Not only are these systems 
characterized by more generous systems of social protection, but employers are more committed to 
the maintenance of such regulation. Despite the erosion of binaries between liberal and coordinated 
systems, recent accounts note continued differences in employer preferences (Bulfone and Afonso, 
2020; Wright et al., 2016). 
 
Owing to these differences in attitudes, we hypothesize that employers in more liberal regimes will be 
more resistant to SSDC regulation; such measures potentially undermine national competitive 
advantages. Employers in more coordinated regimes, who are accustomed to elevated conditions in 
domestic contexts and may wish to combat social dumping, are likely to be more relaxed. We 
understand ‘regulation’ as all SSDC output, though especially legally-binding measures; employers 
have long been opposed to this output (Keller 2003).  
 
(2b) Resources and capabilities will predict employer resistance to regulation 
 
As asserted in 1b, literature indicates that the resources and capabilities of social partners significantly 
influence behaviour (Lévesque and Murray, 2010; Pochet et al., 2009; Prosser and Perin, 2015). There 
is reason to believe that there will be an effect on employer resistance to regulation. Owing to 
prerequisite needs for money and language competence, employers who lack these resources and 
capabilities will be unable to express preferences. As money and language competence increases, 
employers will likely become better at articulating resistance. Though some equate employer non-
engagement in SSDCs with resistance to output, this is problematic. Traditionally, employer non-
engagement is associated with the imposition of regulation by the European Commission. 
 
(3a) Unions in more liberal regimes will be more desirous of regulation than unions in more 
coordinated regimes 
 
As outlined in 2a, liberal regimes are characterized by lower social standards than coordinated 
regimes. Notwithstanding the basis of the competitive advantage of liberal systems, trade unions 
contest poor working conditions in domestic settings. At European-level, union rationales are debated. 
Owing to the potential to achieve competitive advantage, it has been alleged that unions in certain 
liberal systems, particularly those from CEE countries, adopt ambiguous attitudes to European 
regulation. Despite these concerns, literature suggests that unions in liberal regimes generally support 
European regulation; within CEE countries, this has been promoted by recent economic development 
(Prosser, 2018).  
 
Research indicates that a more salient influence is the extent to which European regulation contributes 
to domestic policy contexts. In liberal systems, owing to lower domestic levels of regulation, unions 
are likely to attach greater importance to European regulation. Though unions in coordinated systems 
support such regulation, the better quality of national standards means that this is likely to be a lower 
priority. Despite the erosion of differences between liberal and coordinated systems, recent accounts 
note continued distinctions in union preferences (Wright et al., 2016). 
  
(3b) Resources and capabilities will predict union desire for regulation 
 
As argued in 2b, there is reason to think that the resources and capabilities of social partners will 
exercise greater influence on preferences. We consequently hypothesize that resources and 
capabilities will predict union desire for regulation.  
 
3. Research methodology 
 
Our work is based on case studies of social partner participation in European sectoral social dialogue 
committees (SSDCs) in the hospitals and metal sector. SSDCs play a key role in European social 
policy. Following their establishment in 1998 by the European Commission, SSDCs have promoted 
dialogue between social partners at European level and exist in more than 40 sectors. The output of 
SSDCs tends to be non-legally binding. Of the hundreds of texts which have been concluded since 
1998, the majority are non-legally binding documents such as ‘joint opinions’, ‘guidelines’ and 
‘declarations’. Notwithstanding this tendency, SSDCs have also concluded agreements based on 
Articles 154-5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). These agreements 
have been implemented by both Council decision and social partner affiliates and address topics such 
as working time, health and safety and telework.  
 
We examine social partner behaviour in two sectors (hospitals and metal) within five countries 
(Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and UK). This provides ten observations, allowing variegated 
analysis of countries and sectors. Our countries exhibit varied institutional profiles, table two 
outlining key characteristics. Country selection is ‘diverse’ (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 297), 
countries exhibiting differing levels of coordination and industrial relations capacity. Notwithstanding 
the ebbing of distinctions between liberal and coordinated systems (Baccaro and Howell, 2017), 
recent accounts note the endurance of institutional differences (Wright et al., 2016). Diverse country 
selection allows detection of such differences. 
 
‘Table two about here’ 
 
Our sectors are also diverse. The metal sector is exposed to international competition, crucial to 
member state economies and acts as a pattern-setter in national industrial relations systems. Although 
a metal SSDC has existed since 2008, its output has been somewhat limited; only non-legally binding 
texts, as opposed to agreements based on articles 154-5 of TFEU, have been produced. The hospitals 
sector is unexposed to international competition, though competes on labour markets, and sectoral 
industrial relations structures are well-developed. The output of the hospitals SSDC is comparatively 
significant. Founded in 2006, the SSDC has concluded an agreement on prevention of sharp injuries, 
which was subsequently implemented by Council Directive. 
 
Our study uses semi-structured research interviews, documentary analysis and observation of SSDC 
meetings. 40 interviews were conducted in the studied countries and at European-level with officials 
from the social partners and public authorities. Interviews were carried out between December 2016 
and March 2018. 31 interviews were undertaken at national sectoral level with representative social 
partners in the two sectors and five countries, the five different authors conducting interviews in the 
five different countries. There were also nine interviews at European level with sectoral social 
partners and European Commission experts.  
 
Interviews reflected concerns with engagement and participation and included questions on SSDC 
work programmes and the selection of topics, the capacity of SSDCs to produce concrete outcomes, 
the role of actors in reaching outcomes, modes of engagement between European and national social 
partners and the perceived effectiveness of social dialogue. The semi-structured design ensured that 
interviewees spoke about broader issues, leading to the emergence of unforeseen themes.  
 
After the transcription of interviews, data were analysed iteratively. The authors held post-interview 
meetings, discussing emergent themes, reformulating hypotheses and devising a coding strategy. 
Using a common spreadsheet with categories such as ‘national situation’, ‘joint work programme’ and 
‘outcomes’, authors entered relevant information from each country and sector. Following further 
discussions, the authors developed the hypotheses (see section 2). The spreadsheet was then coded 
using the categories ‘preferences’ and ‘participation’ and the sub-categories ‘employers’ associations’ 
and ‘trade unions’.  
 
Documentary analysis was undertaken. This included publicly available documentation which 
outlined social partner perspectives on social dialogue and SSDC output. Relevant documentation, 
concerning the orientations of social partners and internal workings of SSDCs, was also made 
available by interviewees. Certain SSDC meetings were also observed; we attended a plenary and 
working group of the metal SSDC and a working group of the hospitals SSDC.  
 
4. Participation and preference by regime type 
 
Explaining disparate social partner participation  
 
Participation among national social partners differed substantially. Among German, Swedish and UK 
social partners, respondents affirmed that they regularly attended and contributed to SSDC meetings. 
This is confirmed by other studies (Eurofound, 2018; Prosser and Perin, 2015) and our observations of 
SSDC meetings; the engagement of social partners from these countries is comparatively high. This 
was the case in both the hospitals and metal sectors. The extent to which participation in SSDCs was a 
priority for these organizations is a different question. Though a representative of a hospitals 
employers’ association stated that the European level was becoming more important for the sector, an 
official from a metal sector union asserted that participation in SSDCs was increasingly low, 
indicating limited interest in SSDCs among national social partners. Limited salience of SSDC output 
arguably meant that European social dialogue imperfectly reflected national balances of power (see 
below).  
 
There was weak participation from Italy. In the metal sector, trade unions tended not to directly 
participate in the SSDC, a respondent asserting that participation was often contingent upon 
discussion of themes which were consistent with expertise of an available, English-speaking official. 
Despite this lack of direct participation, unions remained closely informed of the work of the SSDC, 
receiving updates and relevant documentation from Industriall. The metal employers’ association was 
more active in the SSDC, attending meetings and engaging in preparatory work. Similar patterns were 
evident in the hospital sector. Although Italian trade unions participated in SSDC meetings 
sporadically, engagement with EPSU (the European health trade union confederation) was more 
sustained. The employers’ association was more engaged in the SSDC; a respondent asserted that the 
organization was, amongst Southern European countries, the most active in HOSPEEM (the European 
health employers’ association).  
 
Degrees of participation in Poland were very insubstantial; social partners from the country attended 
neither the metal nor hospital SSDC. This was partly attributable to the non-existence of employers’ 
associations in the metal and hospital sectors – in most Polish sectors no such organizations exist - 
though unions also failed to participate. Polish unions had once participated in the hospitals SSDC, 
yet this was no longer the case. PolHosTu1 had even ceased to be members of EPSU (see below).  
 
These trends were affirmed by other interviews, who identified three distinct regional groups; 
Northern European social partners, who participated regularly; Southern European social partners, 
who participated more sporadically; and Central and Eastern European (CEE) social partners, who 
participated to a low degree. An official from a metal sector employers’ association affirmed that 
underdeveloped social dialogue structures and poor resources limited CEE social partner 
participation.  
 
Issues related to resources underpinned many of the problems associated with participation. Though 
the extent of their own resources was not often referred to by Germany, Sweden and UK social 
partners, it is reasonable to conclude that comparatively abundant resources underpinned better 
participation; the superior resources enjoyed by these organizations is confirmed by studies (Prosser 
and Perin, 2015) and various interviewees spoke of the advantage of northern European social 
partners. The case of UK trade unions is interesting. Despite domestic marginalization, comparatively 
strong finances and fluency in English meant that UK unions enjoyed a stronger position at European 
level.  
 
Italian and Polish cases illustrate the problems faced by social partners with few resources. A key 
problem was finance. Owing to costs associated with travelling to SSDC meetings, social partners had 
difficulties meeting this expense. An Italian metalworking union raised this issue, though the problem 
was cited more often in the Italian hospital sector; three social partner interviewees identified costs as 
a barrier to participation. Concerns about finance were more considerable in Poland. An interviewee 
from a Polish metal sector union asserted that although his union attended European meetings in 
which travel costs were funded, lack of funding precluded participation in SSDC meetings. The EPSU 
membership fee even meant that PolHosTu1 were no longer an affiliate, 
 
‘This membership is simply too expensive for us… The union movement in the health sector is 
in decline… so we have less money. The funding we have is spent on more basic activities.’  
 
Aside from the issue of finance, a key impediment was language. The problem of competence in 
relevant languages was more prevalent in Italy and Poland. In the Italian metal sector, a trade union 
official asserted that participation in SSDC meetings was contingent upon the availability of English 
speakers. In the Italian hospitals sector, both sides of industry identified language competence as a 
problem; while respondents had some knowledge of English, this was not sufficient to make their 
participation as active as they would have liked (e.g. engagement in ongoing discussions). The 
problem was more considerable in Poland. Officials in Polish unions are older and tend not to speak 
the languages used in SSDCs; none of our interviewees were able to speak English. A representative 
from a metal sector union summarized this problem,  
 
‘The main obstacle we face here is the language. Unfamiliarity with foreign languages, English 
mostly, stops us from participating in many of the meetings. If there is no translation to Polish, 
we simply cannot understand anything.’ 
 
Language emerged as crucial. In Northern Europe, the capacity of most social partner officials to 
speak English facilitated participation. The ability to speak English as a mother tongue was a 
particular advantage for UK social partners; a representative from a UK metal sector employers’ 
association asserted that the organization’s command of English meant that it drafted documents for 
CEEMET. Social partners in Germany and Sweden also had an abundance of officials who spoke 
fluent English, particularly in the latter country. Though less important than language, the variable of 
location was significant. Given that SSDC meetings take place in Brussels, attendance is particularly 
easy for Belgian social partners. Certain national organizations, including IG Metall, Gesamtmetall 
and the NHS, also have offices in Brussels. 
 
What are the preferences of social partners? 
 
Nordic social partners have long advocated non-legally binding European social dialogue; this has 
been motivated by the desire to defend social partner autonomy within domestic systems of industrial 
relations. The preferences of Swedish social partners continue to reflect such rationales; 
representatives of hospitals and metal sector employers’ association asserted that flexible European 
regulations allowed the Swedish model to be defended. Swedish employers also expressed wider 
preference for non-legally binding regulation. Interviewees from metal and hospitals sector 
employers’ associations asserted that the dialogue should take a flexible form, avoiding rigid 
standards. There was particular opposition to hard regulation and the coordination of wages, which 
threaten collective bargaining prerogatives, but less opposition to health and security issues, which are 
regulated by the Swedish state. Despite this preference for flexibility, aggressive opposition to 
dialogue was not articulated and conciliatory attitudes were sometimes expressed; a representative of 
a metal sector employers’ association stated that it was important to find topics which trade unions 
find interesting.  
 
Swedish trade unions also expressed conciliatory attitudes about the dialogue. Though unions had a 
greater appetite for a harder dialogue than employers, particularly in the hospital sector, calls for a 
more robust social dialogue were muted. Union interviewees in both sectors defined effective 
dialogue as involving joint learning and understanding, omitting more robust benchmarks; scepticism 
about the evaluation of concrete outcomes was even expressed. A respondent in the metal sector 
emphasized the greater importance of achieving understanding and respect, 
 
‘[We established principles such as]: “okay, we unions understand that companies have a need 
for flexibility. In some way, we have to achieve that. But in return, employers must accept that 
consequences for employees must be as limited as possible, so that it becomes bearable.” That 
was about as far as we came. And it may seem very banal, from a Swedish point of view, that: 
“okay, we can sit and talk about these things”. But I saw that it was a significant step for others 
to be able to acknowledge any kind of reasonableness in the position of opponents.’ 
 
German employers espoused mixed views about the dialogue. Although an interviewee from a metal 
sector employers’ association emphasized the benefits of sharing good practice, there was opposition 
to a more robust dialogue. Not only were limits on the mandates of social partners called to attention, 
but the danger of Commission interference in the prerogatives of national social partners was 
emphasized. A representative from a hospital sector employers’ association was more conciliatory, 
stressing benefits of the dialogue; it was asserted that the SSDC addressed practical topics and worked 
effectively.  
 
The views of German trade unions were also mixed. In the hospital sector, union interviewees were 
complementary about the role of The Framework Agreement on Prevention from Sharp Injuries; this 
agreement, concluded in 2009, was considered to have improved conditions within the sector. A 
representative from a hospital sector union was also optimistic about the broader role of the dialogue, 
 
‘When you take into account the amount of time which SSDC takes, then you see that roughly 
one topic per year is addressed and results are reached. And that is amazing given the setting; 
there are many countries, many employers and many different interests… Health and safety in 
Germany has been improved through the needlestick directive. From a trade union point of view, 
SSDCs are important.’ 
 
Such optimism about the dialogue nonetheless fell short of advocating output on ‘harder’ topics; this 
is a traditional demand of more radical unions. In the metal sector, union respondents were less 
optimistic about the record of the dialogue, expressing scepticism about the value of the metal SSDC. 
Interviewees wished for the European Commission to assume a more proactive role and encourage the 
conclusion of sectoral agreements. It was asserted that digitalization would be an ideal topic for such 
an agreement.   
 
Despite traditionally adversarial relations between UK employers and unions and contrasting attitudes 
to European regulation – employers have considered such regulation restrictive whilst unions regard it 
as a key source of substantive rights – fieldwork yielded modest evidence of these trends. Both sides 
of industry were somewhat relaxed about SSDC output. No union respondent mentioned wages as an 
issue which should be addressed by SSDCs, as occurred in Poland (see below), and a representative 
from a health sector union asserted that the outcome of ‘best practice’ should be targeted. A union 
interviewee in the hospital sector also reflected that ‘good practice and joint guidance and joint 
statements is probably as good as it can get’, opining that SSDCs were more important for countries 
with lower social standards.  
 
Trust in domestic employers was also expressed by unions. A hospital sector interviewee ‘trust[ed] 
the employer side representing the UK, for representing the views of the sector accurately and not just 
taking a hard line to defend the employers’ position regardless’. Employers echoed such sentiments. 
A respondent from the hospital sector employers’ association emphasized benefits of exchange of 
good practice with unions, whilst a representative of the metal sector employers’ association asserted 
that, 
 
‘80% of the time we are in violent agreement with trade unions on most things at the EU as well 
national level. We agree on far more than we disagree.’ 
 
This is inconsistent with the adversarial tradition in the UK metal sector, yet there were areas in which 
traditional disagreements between social partners emerged. A representative from a metal sector union 
asserted the union’s preference for agreements, adding that the capacity of topics to achieve a direct 
impact at workplace level was very important. The interviewee also compared UK employers 
unfavourably with European employers. UK metal sector employers expressed opposition to a more 
interventionist social dialogue,  
 
‘There is no initiative issued by the Commission which employers would have initiated, they all 
limit competitiveness. Initiatives don’t take account of the needs of the metal sector… someone 
has to pay for [extra regulation] and it is either the company or member states through increased 
taxation. The EU doesn’t respect the subsidiarity principle. We need a single set of rules for 
everyone to play by, but within that set of rules there has to be freedom to compete. However the 
direction of the EU is to provide too little room to compete. If everyone is doing the same, how is 
a company in Germany competing with one in Italy?’  
 
Employers in the Italian metal sector articulated a tough line; an official stated that the organization 
wished to ‘contain any legal regulation from the European level… [and] avoid a third level of 
collective bargaining’. Associated with this was the goal of a dialogue in which autonomous positions 
were achieved by social partners; the Silica Directive was regarded as a success, given that it was 
produced by social dialogue rather than the direct intervention of the European Commission. The 
association expressed preference for topics which were ‘transversal and basic for all’, contending that 
this improved engagement in SSDCs; it was also asserted that member firms were more likely to 
participate if they had interest in a specific topic. Employers in the Italian hospital sector were more 
conciliatory. Rather than outlining specific red lines, an interviewee expressed preference for a 
‘negotiating culture’. Referring to the agreement on prevention of sharp injuries, it was asserted that 
such an attitude had allowed Italian employers to shape the agreement in line with their preferences.  
 
Italian unions desired legally binding regulation and negotiations on topics which were central to the 
employment relationship. In the metal sector, a respondent asserted the commitment of the union to a 
European minimum wage and basic income, reflecting historic demands of Italian unions for 
European regulation and solidarity. Another union official repeated this demand for dialogue on 
‘harder’ topics, suggesting discussion of wages in European companies. Metal sector unions also 
preferred ‘harder’ regulatory tools, yet this demand was particularly articulated in the hospital sector. 
A representative of a hospital sector union contended that directives, as opposed to non-legally 
binding texts, had potential to ‘reach workers [and] have legitimacy for policymakers’. It was also 
asserted that directives were particularly appropriate for topics such as prevention of sharp injuries 
and working time, owing to their legally enforceable nature.  
 
Italian unions were divided on the record of SSDCs. Hospital sector unions expressed preference for 
legally-binding output, yet it was contended that non-binding dialogue helped diffuse best practice 
and reinforce arguments in national-level negotiations. Metal sector unions were more critical. 
Though it was acknowledged that dialogue per se could be useful, respondents emphasized the need 
for output which went beyond non-binding declarations; officials asserted that coordination in areas 
such as industrial development and environmental policy would make the dialogue more effective. 
 
Notwithstanding problems faced by Polish unions in participating in SSDCs, compounded by the 
absence of employers’ associations in the Polish hospitals and metal sectors, Polish unions expressed 
preferences regarding European social dialogue. In the metal sector, a union official asserted that the 
most important issue was the development of the industry, reflecting longstanding domestic concerns. 
In the health sector, a Polish representative of a union in the process of applying for EPSU 
membership, asserted that there was a need to achieve uniform sectoral standards throughout the EU. 
Similar views were advanced by another health sector union, the interviewee adding that this might 
relent pressure exerted by emigration on the Polish health sector.   
 
A representative from a third health sector trade union expressed frustration with the output of 
SSDCs, affirming that SSDCs neglected core topics in favour of less important issues, 
 
‘The problems which used to be raised at these meetings simply did not reflect the current 
situation in Poland... We face more serious problems than those... Work safety tends to be in the 
last place for us. Our priority is the employment type, the wages or the status of a hospital… I 
was a chairman when Poland was entering the EU. I believed that our accession would help us 
get better standards in terms of employment and wages... This has not yet happened.’ 
 
This position may also be associated with weak Polish participation in SSDCs. Owing to dubious 
perceived benefits of participation, it can be argued that Polish social partners do not regard 
engagement with the dialogue as a priority; this issue is explored further in conclusion.  
 
5. What evidence for the hypotheses? 
 
(1a) Coordination of domestic institutions will predict participation in SSDCs 
Evidence for this hypothesis was unconvincing. In some of our cases, there was an apparent 
association between coordination and participation. In Poland and Sweden, there was close correlation 
between these variables. The cases of Germany, Italy and UK nonetheless suggest that the 
relationship between coordination and participation is contingent. Despite levels of coordination 
differing between domestic hospitals and metal sectors, rates of sectoral participation were similar 
within the three countries. This suggests that the relationship between coordination and participation 
may be collinear with a variable which is peculiar to countries.  
 
(1b) Resources and capabilities will predict participation in SSDCs  
There was strong evidence for this hypothesis. In all cases, money and language competence 
promoted participation in SSDC. Not only did this explain high participation (German, Swedish and 
UK hospitals and metal sectors), but also intermediate (Italian hospitals and metal sectors) and low 
participation (Polish hospitals and metal sectors). The presence of these conditions also promoted 
participation in sectors in which levels of coordination were apparently unfavourable, for example the 
UK metal sector. This suggests that the variable of resources and capabilities is more significant than 
institutional coordination. 
 
(2a) Employers in more liberal regimes will be more resistant to regulation than employers in more 
coordinated regimes 
There was some evidence for this hypothesis. Swedish cases were broadly confirmatory; though 
employers were opposed to hard regulation and the coordination of wages, there was less opposition 
to health and security issues and conciliatory attitudes were sometimes expressed. In Italy and UK, 
metal sector employers were more resistant to regulation than counterparts in the hospitals sector; the 
existence of differences within countries, in which control variables are similar, is potentially telling. 
German cases, in which metal sector employers were more resistant to regulation than less 
coordinated counterparts in the hospitals sector, nonetheless disprove such an inference.  
 
(2b) Resources and capabilities will predict employer resistance to regulation 
This hypothesis explained the basic capacity of employers to articulate resistance to regulation. In the 
Polish case, the non-existence of employers’ associations meant that employers were unable to 
express resistance. Beyond this rudimentary relationship, no association was found. Certain 
employers with abundant resources and capabilities, such as those in the Swedish hospitals and metal 
sectors, adopted a relaxed attitude towards SSDC output.    
 
(3a) Unions in more liberal regimes will be more desirous of regulation than unions in more 
coordinated regimes 
There was some evidence for this hypothesis. Among unions in the Polish hospitals and metal sectors, 
strong preference was expressed for social dialogue on more meaningful topics, including wages. This 
can be linked with less developed labour market conditions within Poland which, although associated 
with the developing profile of the economy, are also related to liberal environments in these sectors. 
An inverse effect was observed in Sweden; in both the hospitals and metal sectors, little desire was 
expressed for a more robust dialogue and certain union interviewees argued for the use of softer tools.  
 
This result can be linked to more coordinated systems in these sectors, though is also associated with 
a desire to defend the voluntarist form of Swedish industrial relations. In the UK, evidence for the 
hypothesis emerged; unions were more desirous of hard output in the less coordinated metal sector. 
German cases were nonetheless inconsistent with the hypothesis. Despite the fact that coordination is 
superior in the metal sector, unions were more desirous of hard output. This may reflect the weaker 
record of the metal SSDC, a potentially collinear variable. Italian cases were inconclusive. Though 
unions in the less coordinated metal sector desired harder output, this demand was replicated in the 
more coordinated hospital sector.  
 
(3b) Resources and capabilities will predict union desire for regulation 
There was little evidence for this hypothesis. Despite poorer resources and capabilities, Polish and 
Italian unions expressed strong preference for social dialogue on more meaningful topics, including 
wages. As resources and capabilities increased, desire for regulation tended not to increase; in the 
Swedish hospitals and metal sectors, unions expressed little desire for more robust dialogue.  
 




Both approaches explained different aspects of engagement in European social dialogue. Though 
there was an apparent link between institutional coordination and participation in SSDCs (H1a), this 
was found to be collinear with resources and capabilities (H1b). The latter hypothesis predicted all 
cases of participation in SSDCs, including those which were at odds with H1a. Therefore, resources 
and capabilities better explain the participation aspect of engagement.  
 
Social partner preferences were more complex. Hypotheses based on resources and capabilities 
explained the basic capacity of social partners to articulate resistance to/desire for regulation (H2b and 
3b); the poorer resources and capabilities of Italian and Polish social partners, especially Polish 
employers, meant that they were unable to fully articulate preferences. These hypotheses were 
nonetheless unable to predict other cases. Hypotheses based on institutional theory fared better, 
helping to account for certain social partner preferences (H2a and 3a).  
 
Resource and capabilities theories therefore performed more effectively than institutional theories; the 
former predicted participation and some preferences, whilst the latter merely explained certain social 
partner preferences. Such findings add to scholarship on social partnership. Given that such literature 
tends to prefer systemic explanations (e.g. Jackson and Muellenborn, 2012; Martin and Swank, 2012; 
Wilkinson and Wood, 2012), our study is a rare case in which agency comes to the fore.  
 
Results are admittedly bound up in our case. Consistent with difficulties which wider theories 
encounter when explaining idiosyncrasies of individual cases, the European social dialogue has its 
peculiarities. As several authorities have underlined, the dialogue suffers from key weaknesses; these 
include lack of negotiations on wages and prevalence of non-legally binding output (González Begega 
and Aranea 2018; Pochet and Degryse 2016; Prosser and Perin, 2015).  
 
Though this does not invalidate the dialogue as a suitable case, as we argue in section III, such flaws 
may not be conducive to the emergence of trends which reflect institutional theory. For example, the 
insubstantial nature of the dialogue can be linked to the non-participation of Polish social partners. If 
SSDCs featured more substantial topics, such as wage-negotiations, social partner engagement might 
be more accordant with predictions based on institutional theory. Differing records of SSDCs are also 
relevant. The desire of German metal sector unions for harder SSDC output, despite greater domestic 
coordination, may reflect the weaker record of the metal SSDC. Notwithstanding these caveats, the 
discovery that resources and capabilities theories better explain the case of European social dialogue 
will interest scholars. As theories of political economies continue to be refined (e.g. Baccaro and 
Howell, 2017), it is vital that broader claims are subject to empirical examination. Our article has 
achieved this, demonstrating comparative merits of competing theories in a transnational context. 
 
It is also worth reflecting on implications of results for differences between countries and sectors. 
Despite the fact that studies of European industrial relations systems have found that similarities 
between sectors can be just as salient (Bechter et al., 2012), our study found that engagement was 
more alike within countries. Levels of participation in SSDCs and the resources and capabilities of 
social partners were strongly associated with nationality. Though sectoral differences sometimes 
accounted for distinct social partner preferences, this effect was not prominent. Findings therefore 
validate approaches which privilege the analysis of countries, even if caveats we have made about 
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Table one: Operationalizing coordination 
 Social partner density Collective bargaining 
practices and density 
Overall coordination 
1 = low 
2 = low intermediate 
3 = high intermediate 
4 = high 
German hospitals 
sector 
There is little 
information available on 
social partner density in 
the sector. It can be 
estimated that density 
rates are not as high as in 




The sector is split into 




coverage is high in the 
public sub-sector, but 
low in the private sub-
sector.  
2 
German metal sector Trade union density is 
approximately 50%*. 
There is no precise 
information on 
employers’ association 
density, but data from 
the sectoral employers’ 
association 
Gesamtmetall suggest 
that the figure is at a 
similar level to trade 
union density.  
Though a sectoral 
agreement exists, there 
has been extensive de-
centralization of 
bargaining to firms in 
recent years. Coverage 
rates for the sector and 
its sub-sectors range 
from 30-65%. 
Coordination between 
regional social partners 
nonetheless continues to 
take place. 
3 
Italian hospitals sector Employers’ association 
and trade union density 
rates are higher than 
levels in other Italian 
sectors, though not as 
high as in hospital 
sectors in certain 
European countries. 
A mixture of sector and 
firm-level bargaining. 
Collective bargaining 
coverage is 100% 
(Eurofound, 2009).  
3 
Italian metal sector Trade union density is 
approximately 35%. 
Density by employed 
workers varies between 
47% of big companies 
and 15% of small 
companies 
Though a sectoral 
agreement exists, there 
has been extensive de-
centralization of 
bargaining to firms in 
recent years. Collective 
bargaining coverage is 
over 90% (Eurofound, 
2018). 
2 
Poland hospitals sector Little reliable 
information is available; 
reports suggest that 
employers’ association 
and trade union density 
is low, even if certain 
unions have some 
members within the 
sector. 
Owing to low levels of 
social partner density, 
little collective 
bargaining takes place. 
1 
Poland metal sector Trade union density is 
6.9%. Employers’ 
Association density is 
Bargaining takes place at 
firm-level, where there is 
a trade union presence. 
Collective bargaining 
1 
very low; one measure is 
0.11%.  
coverage is below 25% 




density is close to 100%. 
Trade union density is 
also high, particularly 
when compared to rates 






Swedish metal sector Social partner density 
rates are very high. By 
one measure, employers’ 
association density is 
82%. There is no exact 
data on trade union 
density, though the 






bargaining coverage is 
over 90% (Eurofound, 
2018). 
4 
UK hospitals sector Trade union density was 
39.3% in 2016; this is 
significantly higher than 
the UK average. The 
employers’ association, 
NHS Employers, has a 
coverage rate of 
approximately 100%.  
Pay is set unilaterally, 
though there is sector-
level bargaining on 
topics such as working 
time and training. Other 
topics are negotiated at 
single-employer (NHS 
trust) level. Collective 
bargaining coverage is 
very high. 
3 
UK metal sector Trade union density is 
29.1%. Employers’ 
association density is 
12.3%. 
Bargaining takes place at 
firm-level, where there is 
a trade union presence. 
Collective bargaining 
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Sources: Visser et al. 2009; Van Rie et al. 2015; Bechter and Brandl 2018 
 
Table three: Hypothesis results 
HP Institutional theory (a)  Resources and capabilities 
theory (b) 
(1)  Participation  Coordination of domestic institutions 
will predict participation in SSDCs 
Resources and capabilities 
will predict participation in 
SSDCs 
 Results: (+) PL and SE,  
(-) DE, IT, UK 
(+) all (Explains high, 
intermediate and low 
participation) 
(2)  Employer resistance to 
regulation 
Employers in more liberal regimes will 
be more resistant to regulation than 
employers in more coordinated 
regimes 
Resources and capabilities 
will predict employer 
resistance to regulation 
 Results: (-) SE;  
(+) IT and UK (M);  
(+) DE mildly resistant 
(+) PL 
(3)  Union desire for European 
regulation 
Unions in more liberal regimes will be 
more desirous of regulation than 
unions in more coordinated regimes 
Resources and capabilities 
will predict union desire for 
regulation 
 Results: (+) PL (H and M);  
(+) IT (M and H); 
(+) UK (M);  




(+) / (-) positive or negative predictability of the theory 
 
